MAIN IDEA:

Here is the author’s definition of the theme and intentions of this book:

“So the realm of strategy is one of bargaining and persuasion as well as threats and pressure, psychological as well as physical effects, and words as well as deeds. This is why strategy is the central political art. It is about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.”

“This book describes the development of different approaches, from rigorous centralized planning processes at one extreme to the sum of numerous individual decisions at the other. It shows how in these distinct military, political, and business spheres, there has been a degree of convergence around the idea that the best strategic practice may now consist in forming compelling accounts of how to turn a developing situation into a desirable outcome. “

“As a history, this book aims to provide an account of the development of the most prominent themes in strategic theory—as they affect war, politics, and business—without losing sight of the critics and dissidents.”

MY TAKE ON IT:

It is a great and detailed review of the history of strategy in multiple domains, from organized violence in wars and revolutions to political actions directed either at changing society’s organization or maintaining an existing one. I disagree with the definition of strategy as “the art of creating power” because it does not sufficiently differentiate between strategy and tactics.  In my opinion, the art of strategy consists of two parts: the first is to identify and articulate realistically achievable objectives with potentially available resources, and the second is to identify methods and processes required to generate and allocate resources over space and time to achieve these objectives reliably. The actual processes of resource generation, allocation, and application are the domain of tactics.  

For example, consider a strategy of fighting off 30,000 Persian troops if one has only 300 Spartans. Historically, the chosen strategy was to use a narrow pass of Thermopylae, where only a few fighters could clash at a time. At first glance, such a strategy makes sense because it greatly diminishes the value of quantitative superiority. However, one step further in thinking would lead to understanding that it is not a valid approach because it does not consider the high probability that after a few hours of battle, the skilled but exhausted Spartans will be killed by less skilled but fresh Persian fighters. It also misses that there was a way around this narrow pass, which the Persians actually used. However, if the strategic decision were not to keep a narrow pass but to divide forces and engage in multiple encounters, each of which would guarantee local superiority of forces, Spartans could win after a hundred or so such engagements over some time sufficient for physical recovery after each engagement, providing tactical skills are sufficient to arrange such engagements.

Similar logic would apply to politics, business, or any other area of strategy, whether the fight is within people’s minds or in the marketplace.